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PLAN oF PARTiTON wITH EcoNoMIC UNioN
The legal aspects of the i947 partition resolution may today appear merely
academic, outdated events of the past, fit for oblivion and without relevance to the
future. The future, however, is determined by the accumulation of past events, and
no reasonable concern for the future can possibly exclude a firm grasp of past events.
Discussing the legal aspects of any problem is imperative, if a correct assessment
is to be accomplished; more so in the case of Palestine, since the legal considerations
were consistently disregarded when the decisions were taken. Even the United
Nations, which was created to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war
and reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights so that justice could always be
maintained, failed to consider the juridical aspects of the Palestine question.
The fate of the Palestinians was decided for them by the United Nations, to
their detriment, without reference to the rule of law. No impartial observer could,
in all fairness, deny that the United Nations was rushed into far-reaching actions
affecting the lives of nearly two million Palestinians without having given careful
and thorough examination to the legal implications involved. The legitimate
aspirations and the high hopes of the whole Arab nation were consequently shattered
when they saw with deep sorrow that the United Nations, the supposed conscience
of mankind, had reached biased conclusions that brought grievous damage to the
cause of justice and international morality.
In fact, throughout the twenty-year debate on Palestine in the United Nations,
the international organization deviated time and again from the path which justice,
law, and ethics would dictate. The law of the Charter was sacrificed for the
convenience of political expediency.
A comprehensive treatment of the various historical developments is beyond
the scope of this presentation. It is only proposed to examine how the United
Nations proceeded to decide the fate of Palestine without due regard to the rule
of law and the basic requirements of justice.
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Great Britain brought the question of Palestine before the United Nations by
letter of April 2, 1947,1 indicating the wish to relinquish the Mandate which had
been conferred upon it by the League of Nations, and suggesting that the United
Nations make recommendations for the future government of Palestine.
As stated in the Preamble of the Mandate for Palestine, the United Kingdom
undertook "to exercise it on behalf of the League of Nations."2  The Mandate
must be considered in the light of the Covenant. One of the primary responsibilities
of the Mandatory Power was to assist the peoples of the territory to achieve full
self-government and independence at the earliest possible date. Article 22, para-
graph i of the Covenant stipulated that "the well-being and development of such
peoples form a sacred trust of civilization." Palestine also fell within the scope of
Article 22, paragraph 4, of the Covenant, which stipulated that
Certain communities, formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire, have reached
a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be pro-
visionally recognized, subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance
by a mandatory power until such time as they are able to stand alone.
The provisions of that paragraph undoubtedly encompassed Palestine, and as
a constitutional instrument, the Covenant's stipulations should supersede any
previous rule which might contradict it. Likewise, any subsequent agreement
regarding the communities formerly constituting the Turkish Empire was pre-
conditioned by the legal status declared in the same paragraph 4, namely, that their
existence as independent nations "can be provisionally recognized." Hence, it was
originally envisioned that when the stage of rendering administrative advice and
assistance had been concluded and the Mandate had come to an end, Palestine
would be independent as of that date, since its provisional independence as a nation
was legally ackowledged by the Covenant. The only limitation imposed by the
League's Covenant upon the sovereignty and full independence of the people of
Palestine was a temporary tutelage entrusted to a Mandatory Power. As already
stated, this was foreseen as a means of rendering advice and assistance to the
Palestinians "until such time as they are able to stand alone." Moreover, the
Covenant dearly differentiated between the communities which formerly belonged
to the Turkish Empire and other, less advanced, people. Regarding the latter,
the Mandatory Power was held responsible for the complete administration of the
territory and was not confined to administrative advice and assistance. These
distinct arrangements can be interpreted as further recognition by the Covenant of
the special status of the former Turkish territories.
Accordingly, the only course of action which the Charter dictated in 1947 was
ILetter from the United Kingdom delegation, U.N. GAOR, ist Spec. Sess., Plenary, Annex i, at 183
(1947).
J C-m. No. 1785 (923), reprinted in Report of the U.N. Special Committee on Palestine [hereinafter
cited as UNSCOP Report], 2 U.N. GAOR, Supp. ii, vol. It, at x8, U.N. Doec. A/292 (x947).
'Article 22, para. 5, Covenant of the League of Nations.
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for the United Nations to ascertain the wishes of the lawful inhabitants of Palestine.
International law and justice required that those Jews and Arabs who, by virtue of
birth, length or status of residence, could satisfy the general requirements of
"nationals," should determine the future government of Palestine. However, it
is axiomatic that only legal residents have a legitimate right to participate in any
plebiscite. Rules to this effect are embodied in the laws of all countries and are
universally accepted.
In 1947, over two-thirds of the Palestinians were Arabs who would unreservedly
have opted for independence. Any alteration of their lawful and inalienable right
to self-determination would run counter to the principles on which the Charter
was founded. Yet, when five Arab states communicated to the Secretary-General
their request that the agenda of the General Assembly's special session include an
item entitled "the termination of the Mandate over Palestine and the declaration
of its independence," the General Committee declined to recommend its in-
clusion.4 The argument raised by the Arab delegates, namely, that their item
should be included on the agenda, since it sought not to limit debate but to assure
that independence was taken into account as a possible solution, was disregarded.
The Arab states, from the outset, demanded the independence of Palestine as
the only logical solution to the termination of the Mandate. They based their case
on the terms of Mandate and Covenant, mentioned above, and on the fact that all
other mandated areas covered by Article 22, paragraph 4 of the Covenant, obtained
their independence when the respective Mandates came to an end. The rights of
the minorities could have been properly safeguarded in accordance with international
law and the United Nations Charter.
This analysis seems to be substantiated by the United Nations Charter, the
prime purposes of which, as set forth in Article i, include, inter alia, the develop-
ment of friendly relations among nations "based on respect for the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples."
It might be argued that the Palestine Mandate was, however, conditioned by
the international recognition accorded the Balfour Declaration.5 This pronounce-
ment could not have altered the legitimacy of Palestine's independence. The fate
of the Palestinians as a whole, Arabs and Jews alike, was governed by the relevant
provisions of the Covenant and, subsequently, the Charter. These fundamental
documents, having a much higher legal value, took precedence over any provision
incorporated in a mandate or trusteeship agreement.
The General Assembly, having refused to include independence for Palestine
as a separate item on its agenda, established a Special Committee on Palestine
(UNSCOP) to prepare a report for the second session of the Assembly. Logic
' U.N. GAOR, ist Spec. Sess., General Comm. 8z (1947).
'For text, see Cacm. No. 5479, at 22 (1937); UNSCOP Report, supra note 2.
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would have required UNSCOP to confine its investigation solely to the problem
of Palestine. The fact that there were destitute and homeless Europeans of Jewish
faith outside of Palestine should not have been a factor in deciding the future
government in Palestine.
However, it was decided in the General Assembly resolution of May 15, 1947,'
which established UNSCOP, to give the Committee broad powers. Paragraph 4
of that resolution permits it to conduct its investigations "wherever it may deem
useful." The resolution also allowed it to receive and examine testimony not only
from the Palestinians, both Arabs and Jews, and the governments concerned, but
also "from such organizations and individuals as it may deem necessary." This was
considered as giving UNSCOP the right to tackle questions beyond the boundaries
of Palestine such as the problem of the displaced persons in Europe. This interpre-
tation was reaffirmed by the broad terms of reference embodied in paragraph 2 of
the same resolution which vested UNSCOP with "the widest powers to ascertain
and record facts . . . relevant to the problem of Palestine."7  One is inclined to
believe that by so broadening the scope of the Special Committee's investigative
authority, the United Nations prejudiced the fate of Palestinian Arabs. This course
of action could hardly have contributed to the achievement of an impartial and just
solution for Palestine.
At any rate, the UNSCOP report to the General Assembly did contain two
recommendations relevant to the problem of displaced persons of Jewish faith in
Europe. The first (recommendation VI) was adopted unanimously.8 It requested
the Assembly to undertake immediately the necessary measures whereby the problem
of the displaced European Jews would be dealt with as a matter of extreme urgency.
This was recommended as an important factor in allaying the fears of Arabs in
Palestine as well as in other Arab states, so that their countries would not be
marked as the sole place of settlement for the Jews of the world. Thus UNSCOP
expressly stated that the problem of the displaced European Jews should not be
solved at the expense of the Arabs. The second recommendation, approved by a
substantial majority, stated that "in the appraisal of the Palestine question, it accepted
as incontrovertible that any solution for Palestine can not be considered as a solution
of the Jewish problem in general" 9
It would seem abundantly clear that although the majority of UNSCOP did
recommend partition and the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine, it was not
suggested that the creation of this state would be the solution for displaced European
Jews. Unlimited Jewish immigration was not espoused by the members of
UNSCOP. In fact, the essence of recommendation VI entitled "Jewish displaced
' G.A. Res. io6, U.N. GAOR, ist Spec. Sess., Resolutions 6, U.N. Doc. A/3xo (x947).
1 Emphasis added.
8 UNSCOP Report, supra note 2, vol. I, at 44.
" Recommendation XII, id. at 46.
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persons,"'" was that this problem was an international responsibility emanating
from the Second World War, and should have been dealt with separately. In other
words, immigration to Palestine was dearly ruled out as the only solution to this
humanitarian question. It can be inferred from the UNSCOP recommendation
that the countries of the new world, whose vastness, and potentialities could easily
accommodate hundreds of thousands, should be called upon to open their doors for
the displaced Europeans. Even President Roosevelt had accepted this premise in
dealing with Mr. Churchill during the Second World War." Alleviating the suffer-
ings of the Nazi victims in a noble humanitarian endeavour was not, however,
explored seriously by the General Assembly, which forsook the lofty principles
of the Charter and sought, instead, to foster the political objectives of Zionism.
In the committee stage of the second regular session of the General Assembly,
the Palestine case was handled by the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Ques-
tion, which based its work on the report of UNSCOP. Instead of considering
adoption of the Report's unanimous recommendations, and then endeavoring to
reconcile the divergent views, the Ad Hoc Committee chose a path which widened
the cleavages between proponents of the majority and minority plans.
It seems anomalous that the procedure adopted for the consideration of the report
was delegated to two subcommittees of the Ad Hoc Committee, one composed of
pro-partition delegates and the other of Arab delegates plus Colombia and Pakistan,
which were sympathetic to the Arab cause. It was obvious that those two sub-
committees were so unbalanced as to be unable to achieve anything constructive.
As was later made evident, the task of reconciling their conflicting recommendations
was impossible. In such circumstances, it was not surprising that no serious
attention was given to the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinians.
Subcommittee 2 attempted to draw the attention of the Assembly to the legal
and constitutional issues involved. It sought to ascertain not only the competence
of the General Assembly to deal with the problem, but equally its ability to recom-
mend and enforce any specific solution.
Its report recommended the adoption of three proposals, of which one called
for the submission of eight questions to the International Court of Justice for
advisory opinions in accordance with Article 96 of the Charter and Chapter 4 of
the Statute of the Court. The questions called for interpretations of commit-
ments, obligations, and responsibilities growing out of the administration of
Palestine under the League of Nations, and the competence of the United Nations
to recommend partition or trusteeship for Palestine without obtaining the consent
of the inhabitants. It was proposed specifically that the Court be asked to decide
Whether the United Nations, or any of its Member States, is competent to enforce
or recommend the enforcement of any proposal concerning the constitution and
" UNSCOP Report, supra note 2, vol. I, at 44.
1 1R. STEVENS, AmERICAN ZIONISM AND UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 1942-1947, at 71 (1962).
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future government of Palestine, in particular, any plan of partition which is con-
trary to the wishes, or adopted without the consent of, the inhabitants of Palestine.12
The vote on these questions is of considerable significance and indicates that
legal aspects were not clear in the minds of a substantial number. of states. Seven
of the questions were defeated by twenty-five countries voting against while
eighteen voted in favor and eleven abstained. The eighth question, quoted above,
was defeated by twenty-one votes to twenty, with thirteen abstentions.13 Doubts
which existed continued to persist and remained unanswered. It was olbvious
that it was extremely difficult for many delegations to pronounce any judgment
without further study and reference to the total dimensions of the problem. Yet,
the General Assembly rejected all attempts to postpone the voting on the partition
resolution' 4 and proceeded to vote on partition while member states were un-
justifiably denied a reasonable. period of time to study the relevant aspects in order
to satisfy their conscience. Now, it is not even of academic value to speculate on the
outcome of the Assembly's debate, had the legal issues been clarified.
However, no definite plan should have been endorsed by the United Nations
without a comprehensive study of the manifold legal problems involved. True, it
might have been somewhat difficult to scrutinize the conflicting claims under the
confused and chaotic conditions which prevailed in Palestine in 1947. Nevertheless,
this fact should not suggest that such scrutiny was too much to expect from the inter-
national community. -
Partition-at least partition under the above-mentioned circumstances-was not
the inevitable solution which the Assembly had no alternative but to recommend.
What was and is unacceptable was the recommendation of partition of Palestine
without clarifying the sound legal objections raised by the Arabs. What was and is in-
conceivable was the allocation of forty-two per cent of the total area of Palestine to
two-thirds of the population, while the remaining one-third of the population was
generously granted over fifty-six per cent.
Today, in retrospect, it might be proper to refrain from passing judgment
on the merits of the concept of partition. Yet, it is safe to state that the complete
dereliction by -the .United Nations of its duty toward the legitimate interests of
Palestinians is directly responsible for the bloodshed that has distressed the area for
over twenty years.
The General Assembly did recommend the partition of Palestine14a and that is a
historic fact. However, the Assembly's powers according to Articles 10, II, 12, and
14 of the Charter are only recommendatory and without binding force on Member
States. Hence, the Arab states did not contravene their Charter obligations when
is2 U.N. GAOR Ad Hoc Comm. on the Palestinian Question, Annex 25, at 300-ox, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.14/3z and Add. 1 (1947).
"Both votes are recorded, id. at 203.
24E.g., id. at 2ox (Colombia).
'" G.A. Res. 181, 2 U.N. GAOR, Resolutions 131, 132 (1947).
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they, responding to the will of the Palestine Arab majority, rejected the Partition
Plan.
After this somewhat lengthy, yet inexhaustive review of what may be called
"the ancestry of partition," it is now appropriate to make special reference to two
of the consequences of the partition resolution which have far-reaching legal impli-
cation.
A. The Legal Nature of the Partition Resolution
The first is that Israel considered the General Assembly resolution as the legal
basis for its establishment. On May 14, 1948, the following declaration was issued in
Tel Aviv:15
We, members of the People's Council, representatives of the Jewish Community
of Eretz-Israel and of the Zionist Movement, are here assembled on the day of
the termination of the British mandate over Eretz-Israel and, by virtue of our
natural and historic right and on the strength of the resolution of the United
Nations General Assembly, hereby declare the establishment of a Jewish State in
Eretz-Israel, to be known as the State of Israel.
I shall refrain from discussing the alleged national and historic rights with
roots which are thousands of years old and which are, to say the least, fraught with
controversy and ambiguity. Nevertheless, even if established, it is doubtful that
these factors could create a legal right which supersedes the right of the Palestinian
Arabs. As to the partition resolution itself, it is to be reiterated and clearly under-
stood that the General Assembly could do no more than recommend a solution
and that its recommendation was not accepted by an Arab majority in Palestine.
Hence, it could not possibly be considered as a valid legal foundation for the 1948
Zionist declaration of statehood. To this should be added the fundamental fact that
the General Assembly resolution of November 29, 1947, recommended the partition
of Palestine between an Arab and a Jewish state, with an economic union linking
them. The Assembly took great care in drawing their respective boundaries.
Although as mentioned above the distribution of land was "detrimental to the
legitimate rights of the overwhelming majority of the Palestinians, namely the
Arabs, yet the boundaries allotted to the Jewish state constitutes a categorical limita-
tion on Israel to claim legitimacy beyond them. Every addition to the 1947
boundaries has been accrued by the use of force contrary to the principles of the
United Nations Charter and the rules of the contemporary law of nations.
B. Admission of Israel to the United Nations
The second consequence of Partition to be considered was the admission of Israel
to the United Nations, which was based, inter alia, on the following factors as indi-
cated in the relevant resolution of the General Assembly:"0
5 [1948] Laws of the-State of Israel, vol. I, p. 3.
" G.A. Res. 273, 3 U.N. GAOR, pt. 1, Resolutions 18, U.N. Doc. 900 (1949).
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Noting furthermore the declaration by the State of Israel that it "unreservedly
accepts the obligations of the United Nations Charter and undertakes to honour
them from the day when it becomes a Member of the United Nations,"
Recalling its resolutions of 29 November 1947 and ii December 1948 and taking
note of ,he declarations and explanations made by the representative of the Govern-
ment of Israel before the ad hoc Political Committee in respect o'f the implementation
of the said resolution ....
Here again, the General Assembly deviated from the law of the Charter by
ascribing legal effects to its recommendation of partition.
Since the General Assembly's partition resolution was taken as a legal justifica-
tion for both Israel's existence as a state and its subsequent admission to the United
Nations, the least which might have been expected from Israel was to respect and
fully abide by all United Nations resolutions and every obligation which emanates
from them. Ironically, this has not been the case.
The General Assembly resolution of December ii, I948,17 referred to in the
last quoted paragraph, which represents an endeavor by the United Nations to
apply certain principles of justice to the Palestine question, also sheds light on the
Assembly's decision to admit Israel.
One of the most thorny and outstanding questions was undoubtedly the refugee
problem, which was provided for in paragraph ii of that resolution.' The principle
of repatriation or compensation is a just one and was worthy of immediate imple-
mentation. The Palestine Conciliation Commission, established by the same resolu-
tion, was, in fact, engaged in its arduous task of aiding the parties to reach agree-
ment on this and other relevant questions at the time Israel was admitted to
membership. Its failure with respect to the refugee question was due to the failure
and refusal of Israel to comply with the Assembly's recommendation on the subject.
II
THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS
The hostilities which broke out upon the end of the Mandate in May I948, led
to the conclusion in 1949 of separate armistice agreements between Israel and
Jordan, 0 Israel and Syria,20 Israel and Egypt,2 and Israel and Lebanon.2 Apart
from the United Nations Charter, the armistice agreements represent the only
'
7G.A. Res. 194 (I1), 3 U.N. GAOR, pt. I, Resolutions 21, U.N. Doe. A/81o (1948).
18 "Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their
neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation
should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to prop-
erty which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the
Governments or authorities responsible;
"Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic
and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation ...."
19 42 U.N.T.S. 303, no. 656; 4 U.N. SCOR, Spec. Supp. I, U.N. Doc. S/1302/Rev. 1 (1949).
20 42 U.N.T.S. 327, no. 657; 4 U.N. SCOR, Spec. Supp. 2, U.N. Doec. S/1353/Rev. 1 (1949).
21 42 U.N.T.S. 251, no. 654; 4 U.N. SCOR, Spec. Supp. 3, U.N. Doec. S/1264/Rev. i (1949).
22 42 U.N.T.S. 287, no. 655; 4 U.N. SCOR, Spec. Supp. 4, U.N. Doec. S/i296/Rv. z (x949).
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legal instruments which regulate the relationship between Israel and the Arab
states. This fact, per se, should add greater weight to the binding force of the
agreements. The parties to the four armistice agreements were, according to the
preambles, "responding to the Security Council resolution of i6 November 1948"
which called upon them "as a further provisional measure under Article 40 of the
Charter of the United Nations to seek agreement forthwith."2  The preambles
further state that the parties "decided to enter into negotiations under United
Nations chairmanship" concerning the implementation of that resolution. It should
be emphasized that the resolutions in question envisaged action under Chapter
VII of the U.N. Charter. The reference to Chapter VII is of paramount im-
portance for it implies that the resolution is a decision and not a recommendation;
according to Article 25, United Nations members "agree to accept and carry out
the decisions of the Security Council."
The armistice agreements contained several basic principles which were sub-
sequently flouted by Israel with impunity. Reference may be made in this con-
nection to Article i, paragraph I, of each agreement, which prescribes that "the
injunction of the Security Council against resort to military force in the settlement
of the Palestine question shall henceforth be scrupulously respected by both parties."
This would be relevant when recalling Article 4, paragraph I, of the Egyptian-
Israeli agreement (Article 2, paragraph I, of the three other agreements), stating
that "the principle that no military or political advantage should be gained under
the truce ordered by the Security Council is recognized."
Also relevant is Article I, paragraph 2, of each agreement, which stipulates that
"No aggressive action by the armed forces-land, sea or air--of either party shall
be undertaken ...."
However, hardly two weeks after the signing of the agreement with Egypt, on
February 24, 1949, Israel launched its long series of violations. Its armed columns
advanced on March io to the Gulf of Aqaba and occupied the vicinity of Bir Qattar.
This illegal occupation was put before the Egyptian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Com-
mission," and the Special Committee25 decided on March 20, 195o that, "The
advance of Israel forces on io March 1949 to the Gulf of Akaba area and the occupa-
tion of Bir Qattar is a violation of article IV, paragraphs i and 2 of the Egyptian-
Israel General Armistice Agreement." 6
The matter was further examined by the Security Council which took note of
the statement of the Government of Israel that Israel armed forces will evacuate
Bir Qattar pursuant to the 2o March 195o decision of the Special Committee
provided for in article X, paragraph 4, of the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice
2 S.C. Res. 62 (1948). The Egyptian-Israel Agreement also refers in this connection to S.C. Res.
61 (1948).
2' Provided for in Art. X(i) of the Egyptian-Israel Armistice Agreement.
"Provided for in Art. X(4 ) of the Egyptian-Israel Armistice Agreement.26 Cf. 5 U.N. SCOR, 522d meeting 2 (1950).
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Agreement, and that the Israel armed forces will withdraw to positions authorized
by the Armistice Agreement. 27
The failure and refusal of Israel to withdraw was a flagrant violation of the
letter and spirit of the Armistice Agreement.
Another example of Israel's disrespect of the agreements is the fate of the
demilitarized zones provided for in the agreements with Egypt and Syria. Long
before its 1967 attack on the Arab states, Israel annexed by force parts of the demili-
tarized zones.
For some time now, Israel has declared that it is no longer bound by the armistice
agreements. Mr. Ben Gurion stated in November i956 after the Suez war that,
"[T]he armistice with Egypt is dead, as are the armistice lines, and no wizards
or magicians can resurrect these lines."29
Thus, Israel claimed for itself the right to repudiate unilaterally an international
agreement concluded under the auspices of the Security Council in conformity with
Chapter VII powers.
Is Israel's disavowal of these international obligations vindicated under the
norms of international law?
A thorough examination of the historical circumstances preceding the con-
clusion of the armistice and the legal and political consequences derived from its
provisions definitely leads to only one conclusion: the armistice agreements could
not be revoked by any one party. However, even when there might be mutual
consent of the parties Concerned, a decision of the competent United Nations organ
would be necessary in order to terminate their effects legally.
A careful perusal of the deliberations and resolutions of the Security Council
which relate to the armistice agreements dearly reveals that the armistice is a
direct ancillary of decisions which fall within the scope of Chapter VII. Arguments
27 S.C. Res. 89 (1950).
"
8The El Auja demilitarized zone was created by Article VIII(i) of the Egyptian-Israel General
Armistice Agreement, providing as follows:
. "The area comprising the village of El Auja and vicinity, as defined in paragraph 2 of this
Article, shall be demilitarized, and both Egyptian and Israeli armed forces shall be totally ecx-
cluded therefrom. The Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission established in Article X
of this Agreement. and United Nations Observers attached to the Commission shall be responsible
for ensuring the full implementation of this provision."
This area has been occupied by Israel since 21 September 1955. See Report of the Secretary General
•.. pursuant to the Council's resolution of 4 April x956 on the Palestine Question, ix U.N. SCOR, Supp.
April-June 1956, at 30, 46-47, U.N. Doc. Sf3596 (1956).
Israel claimed sovereignty, disregarding the fact that Article VIII(5) of the agreement in question
stated that:
"The movement of armed forces of either Party to this Agreement into any part of the area
defined ih paragraph 2 of this Article, for any purpose, or failure by either Party to respect or
fulfil any of the other provisions of this Article, when confirmed by the United Nations repre-
sentatives, shall constitute a flagrant violation of this Agreement."
The demilitarized zone established by the Israeli-Syrian Armistice Agreement had been encroached
upon by Israel since 1951, as stated in' S.C. Res. 93 (i95x), which called for withdrawal of Israeli police
units which continued to exercise general control over the demilitarized zone.
29 N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1956, at 6, col. 8.
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advanced to suggest that either party is at liberty to relinquish obligations which
arise under the agreements cannot be legally substantiated. Equally all arguments
which purport to suggest that the mutual consent of the parties, without the approval
of the Security Council, suffices to terminate the armistice agreements, ought to be
discarded as inaccurate. It is submitted that even by mutual consent, the parties
concerned cannot terminate the agreements without the endorsement of the Council.
This view is fully corroborated by the fact that the Security Council on 16 November
1948 adopted resolution 62, ° which, in the preamble, reaffirmed that organ's previous
resolutions concerning the establishment and implementation of the truce in Pales-
tine, and recalled, particularly, its resolution of July 15, 1948,31 which determined
that the situation in Palestine constituted a threat to the peace within the meaning
of Article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations. The operative part of the
former resolution is of particular importance and reads as follows:
i. Decides that, in order to eliminate the threat to the peace in Palestine and
to facilitate the transition from the present truce to permanent peace in Palestine,
an armistice shall be established in all sectors of Palestine;
2. Calls upon the parties directly involved in the conflict in Palestine, as a
further provisional measure under Article 40 of the Charter, to seek agreement
forthwith, by negotiations conducted either directly or through the Acting Medi-
ator, with a view to the immediate establishment of the armistice, including:
(a) The delineation of permanent armistice demarcation lines beyond which
the armed forces of the respective parties shall not move; (b) Such with-
drawal and reduction of their armed forces as will ensure the maintenance of
the armistice during the transition to permanent peace in Palestine.
By considering the situation in Palestine as "a threat to the peace," the Council
established for itself an exclusive right of complete supervision of the functioning
and the eventual termination of the armistice agreements. These agreements identi-
cally stated that each was concluded pursuant to the Security Council resolution
of November i6, 1948. In order for the agreements to be terminated, the Security
Council, the organ vested with primary responsibility for the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security under the Charter, would have to determine that the
situation in Palestine had ceased to be a threat to the peace. Unless the Security
Council undertakes this determination, thus endorsing the action embarked upon by
the parties with their mutual consent, the armistice agreements are legally valid and
the parties are bound by their provisions.
The Secretary-General states, in his annual report for 1966-1967, that "there has
been no indication either in the General Assembly or in the Security Council that
the validity and applicability of the Armistice Agreements have been changed as
a result of the recent hostilities or of the war of I956.''32 He further states that "there
"S.C. Res. 62 (1948).
"S.C. Res. 54 (1948).
2 Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization 16
June 1966-15 June 1967, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. iA, para. 42, U.N. Doe. No. A/67ox/Add. 1 (1967).
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is no prov',sion in them for unilateral termination of their application. This has
been the United Nations position all along and will continue to be the position until
a competent organ decides otherwise.""
I submit that there is no innovation in this view. Indeed it has not been challenged
even by the Israelis. In i951, Mr. Rosenne, then Israel's Legal Adviser, stated that
the most difficult question is the meaning of the phrase, "that each agreement shall
remain in force until a peaceful settlement between the parties is achieved. '34  He
answers this point by stating that
any purported peaceful settlement by the parties would be subject to review by one
of the organs of the United Nations. This is particularly appropriate when it is
remembered that the Security Council's action which preceded the Armistice negotia-
tions was taken pursuant to provisions contained in Chapter VII.
This I submit seems to be the correct interpretation of the Security Council's position
vis-a'-vis the termination of the armistice agreements3 5
To sum up this point, recognition of the supervisory authority of the Security
Council in this regard clearly indicates that the parties' mutual consent does not by
itself terminate the armistice agreements. Obviously, unilateral repudiation is
completely ruled out and could not possibly be sanctioned by the United Nations as
stated in no ambiguous terms by the Secretary-General. Moreover, the Israelis
themselves did not even allude to this possibility until 1956 when they invaded Egypt.
Mr. Eban, then Israel's representative to the United Nations, stated in 1949 at the
Security Council that "the effective position, therefore, is that these Agreements have
no time limit and can be altered only by agreed amendments."'
III
THE LAw OF TREATms
Certain articles of the International Law Commission's draft on the Law of
Treaties have a direct bearing on international agreements in general, and upon the
present subject of discussion in particular.
Although the draft articles are still to be adopted, at the United Nations Confer-
ence on the Law of Treaties, which will open shortly in Vienna, and it might there-
fore be argued that the rules contained therein are not yet binding on any state,
it may nevertheless be pointed out that they have been amply discussed in the Inter-
S2Id.
84 S. RosmNN'E, IsRAE'S ARMISTIcE AGREEMENTS WITH TiE ARAB STATES: A JURIDIcAL INTERPRETATION
71 ('95')-
" Although Mr. Rosenne stated later, id. at 72, "but it is believed that a more thorough analysis
might show that this is not the case and that if the parties should decide themselves that a peaceful settle-
meat is achieved between them, then the Security Council would have no alternative but formally to
take note of the parties' decision and draw the proper consequences therefrom," it is submitted that he
nevertheless impliedly acknowledged the supervisory authority of the Council towards the armistice
agreements.
as4 U.N. SCOR, 4 3 3d meeting 13 (x949).
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national Law Commission, and in both the Sixth Committee and plenary sessions of
the General Assembly. Therefore, they may be considered evidence of the con-
temporary norms of international law.
To put the matter in the right perspective, it should be recalled that having
attacked and subsequently occupied Arab lands, Israel is now striving to consolidate
its newest illegitimate fait accompli. It now declares its willingness to conclude
new agreements with the Arab states using the occupied territories as a lever to
extract concessions from the Arabs.
Would the rules of international law legitimize Israel's attempts? A glance at
the law of treaties definitely reveals that what Israel seeks could not be sanctioned
by the contemporary law of nations. This submission is in conformity with the
International Law Commission's draft.37 In Article 5o , it is stipulated that "A treaty
is void if it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law from which
no derogation is permitted."3 Hence, the Commission considered that treaties would
be invalidated if they contradict a rule having the character of jus cogens. It is
universally recognized that principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter such
as sovereign equality and territorial integrity of states are pertinent examples of
jus cogens.
Article 49 of the International Law Commission's draft stipulates that "A treaty
is void, if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation
of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations." 9 This article is self-
explanatory and the provisions of the two articles would render any treaty concluded
between the Arab states and Israel, resting on seizure of territories by force, void and
not legally binding.
It is self-evident that the occupation by one state of territories belonging to other
states is contrary to the principles of the United Nations and could only be considered
as overt coercion upon the other parties which would invalidate any subsequent
treaty.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it would seem imperative to require strict adherence from all
parties to the armistice agreements as a step to establish stability in the Middle East.
Justice is never accomplished unless full respect for international agreements is fully
maintained. If peace is to be honestly strived for in the Middle East, the key measure
undoubtedly lies in applying the rule of law and justice.
"' Chapter 2 of the Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its eighteenth
session, Geneva, 4 May-39 July x966 (in Part R of the Reports of the Commission to the General
Assembly, U.N. Doe. A/6 3 o9/Rev. a) (x966), 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMm'N 173, 177 (1966).8 Id. at 183.
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